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Litigation Loansharks:
A History of Litigation Lending and a
Proposal to Bring Litigation Advances
Within the Protection of Usury Laws
Jenna Wims Hashway*
INTRODUCTION'
On the night of February 20, 2003, a rock band set off
unlicensed pyrotechnics in a poorly maintained, overcrowded
nightclub, igniting the highly flammable foam that club owners
had glued to the walls. One hundred patrons died in the ensuing
inferno, and hundreds more were injured, some catastrophically. 2
The Station Nightclub fire was the fourth worst nightclub fire in
U.S. history-an enormous mass casualty event in the nation's
* JD, Roger Williams University School of Law; Bachelor of Business
Administration, Hofstra University. Judicial Law Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy
Court, District of Rhode Island. Member of the Rhode Island and
Massachusetts Bars, and the Federal Bar for the District of Rhode Island.
The author wishes to thank the staff of the Roger Williams University Law
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information and direction. In particular, the author would like to thank her
husband, the late Fred S. Hashway, Jr,. for doing the math, but most of all,
for his firm conviction that she could accomplish anything-including law
school in midlife.
1. Excerpts of this article originally appeared in the March/April 2011
Edition of the Rhode Island Bar Journal. John P. Barylick & Jenna Wims
Hashway, Litigation Financing: Preying on Plaintiffs, R.I. B. J., Mar./Apr.
2011, at 5.
2. Angie Cannon, Looking for Answers in the Ashes, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 2004, at 32, 32.
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smallest state. 3
Lawsuits follow tragedy as night, the day. Overnight, the
Station fire created not only widows, widowers, and orphans, but
also a large pool of economically disadvantaged plaintiffs in what
promised to be a lengthy litigation. Where most would see only
tragedy, one industry spotted opportunity. Late night television
ads offering easy cash advances to needy plaintiffs began airing on
local television stations. Thus were Rhode Island viewers
introduced to the concept of "litigation financing."
During the last decade, a new industry was born. Litigation
financing, the brainchild of a former loan shark,4 offers cash
advances to plaintiffs during the pendency of their litigation, with
the promise that if plaintiffs do not win a judgment or settlement,
they owe nothing. If they do win, the loan is repaid from the
proceeds of the lawsuit-at interest rates of up to 280%.5 If the
amount of the judgment is less than the sum owed, the plaintiff
ends up with nothing. It is a lousy deal. But plaintiffs who are
unable to work in the aftermath of their injuries are at a distinct
disadvantage when it comes to waiting years for their cases to be
resolved. Litigation Financing Companies (LFCs) argue, not
without basis, that their services help level the playing field by
allowing plaintiffs to wait out lowball settlement offers from deep-
pocketed defendants. But this service comes at an exorbitant cost.
Despite calls for regulation, LFCs operate with no licensing or
oversight. Their lending agreements are carefully worded to avoid
application of state usury statutes. Some plaintiffs have
succeeded in having their loan agreements rescinded in state
court 6 but, to date, LFCs have been able to adapt, and to lobby for
legislation that allows them to operate with impunity. The
playing field upon which an injured plaintiff and an intransigent
defendant meet may be leveled somewhat by cash in the plaintiffs
pocket, but the ground beneath LFCs and plaintiff-borrowers is
3. Id.
4. Richard B. Schmitt, Staking Claims: A Las Vegas Lender Tests Odds
in Court,WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2000, at Al.
5. See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and
Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 85, 98 (2002) [hereinafter
Martin, Usury].
6. See, e.g., Echeverria v. Lindner, 7 Misc. 3d 1019(A), No. 018666/2002,
2005 WL 1083704, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005).
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far from level or smooth. Legislation is needed to protect plaintiffs
from being further victimized as they await the outcome of their
litigation. But plaintiffs have no lobbyists.
This article proposes both a model remedial statute to bring
litigation lending within the purview of state usury statutes, and
a strategy for developing the political will necessary to pass such a
statute.
In the wake of mass casualty events like 9/11, the Station
Fire, and Hurricane Katrina, there will always be predators who
seek to profit from the tragedy of others. It took seven years for
the parties in the Station Fire civil litigation to reach a final
settlement. In the two years between settlement in principle and
disbursement of proceeds, a number of Station Fire victims
resorted to litigation advances to make ends meet. 7 While most
took only one or two advances, one widow received thirteen
separate advances, totaling $80,500.8 When she received her
settlement check, seventeen months after taking the first advance,
she was obliged to repay $137,777, yielding an effective annual
percentage rate of 64.7%.9
Fortunately, political will can also grow from tragedy. Just as
charitable contributions rise in the wake of a tragedy, legislators
sometimes rise to propose laws that protect victims. After the
Station Nightclub fire, when the scope of liability became
apparent, the Rhode Island legislature passed an amendment to
the state's joint tortfeasor contribution statute.1o The statute, in
its prior incarnation, posed a substantial impediment to
settlement by providing that if one tortfeasor settled, any
judgment later obtained against remaining defendants would be
reduced by the greater of either the dollar amount of the
settlement or the settling defendant's percentage of fault."
Because it would be impossible for plaintiffs to predict the
eventual percentage-of-fault set-off, it would be too risky for
plaintiffs in a lawsuit with scores of defendants to settle with less
7. JOHN BARYLICK, KILLER SHow: THE STATION NIGHTCLUB FIRE,
AMERICA'S DEADLIEST ROCK CONCERT 227 (forthcoming Sept. 2012).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §10-6-8 (Supp. 2011).
11. R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-8 (1997), amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-8
(Supp. 2011).
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than all of them. To resolve this Catch-22 and enable settlement,
the Rhode Island legislature modified the statute so that, in cases
where more than twenty-five deaths occur, settlement with one of
several joint tortfeasors results in a straight dollar-for-dollar set-
off from any future judgment.12 This statute made it possible for
Station Fire plaintiffs to negotiate $176 million in settlements.' 3
In a similar remedial spirit, this Article discusses the need for
bringing litigation financing within the purview of state usury
statutes. It begins with a detailed look at the history of this fairly
new industry and an overview of how litigation funding works.
Part II reviews the recent line of cases challenging litigation loan
agreements, attempts at industry regulation, and an agreement
made between the New York Attorney General and a consortium
of LFCs. Part III examines several litigation loan agreements as a
means of assessing how well the industry lives up to its much-
touted self-regulation, and reviews the reaction of the litigation
financing industry to any attempt to rein in its excesses. Part IV
proposes a model remedial statute for addition to states' existing
usury statutes, which would clearly define litigation lending as
"loans" and bring them within the purview of each state's usury
law. This Article concludes by reviewing the recent lobbying
efforts of the LFCs and suggesting that state legislators harness
the political will created by recent tragedies in order to pass
much-needed legislation to protect their constituents from these
predatory lenders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Litigation Financing
Litigation financing is a relatively new industry: born in the
1990's, it grew rapidly, in part due to the effectiveness of internet
advertising.14  Because LFCs are not regulated like banks,
12. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-8 (Supp. 2011).
13. Tracy Breton, Judge Approves Settlement for Fire Victims; Station
Fire, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 8, 2010, at 5; see also Alexandria E. Baez,
Comment, Joint Tortfeasors, Full Compensation, and the 1,800 Degree
Crucible: Rekindling Rhode Island's Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act in the Aftermath of the Station Nightclub Fire, 12 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 386, 387 (2007).
14. Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime
Industry that has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 83
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industry figures are hard to come by.15  The American Legal
Finance Association (ALFA), a trade group that represents twenty
of the largest LFCs does not disclose industry figures beyond
claiming that their members have originated ninety percent of
currently outstanding legal funding.16
The origins of the industry are perhaps more illuminating.
Perry Walton, a Las Vegas entrepreneur, is the godfather of
litigation financing. Following a career that included stints as a
rock musician and mobile-home park developer, Walton made his
first foray into extortionate lending with a business he named
Wild West Funding.' 7 In 1997, after several of Walton's borrowers
complained that they were threatened when they fell behind in
their loans, a police investigation resulted in Walton's pleading
guilty to "extortionate collection of debt."18  Walton drew a
sentence of eighteen months of probation, and by the following
year, he had hit upon a somewhat more legitimate lending
opportunity.19
Dubbing his new business Future Settlement Funding Corp.,
Walton began loaning money to plaintiffs, structuring these
advances as "contingent obligations" in order to sidestep usury
laws.20 He then invited would-be lenders to seminars, charging as
much as $12,400 to impart the secret of his lucrative new
scheme. 21 Two years later, 400 people had been trained by
Walton, and a new subprime industry was born. 22
The precise size of this industry today is impossible to
gauge.23 Barriers to entry are almost nonexistent: with no
(2008) [hereinafter Martin, Subprime].
15. See id. at 101.
16. Facts About ALFA, AM. LEGAL FIN. Ass'N, http://www.americanlegal
fin.com/FactsAboutALFA.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
17. Schmitt, supra note 4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. Walton has engaged in litigation financing under several
business names, including: Law Finance Group, Inc., Resolution Settlement
Corp., and Future Settlement Funding. See Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation
Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 619 &
n.11 (2007); Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal
Needs Act: A Regulatory Framework to Legitimatize Third Party Litigation
Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 347, 347 (2004); Schmitt, supra note 4.
23. McLaughlin, supra note 22, at 622.
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licensing requirements, all a prospective lender needs is a website
and fairly modest capitalization. 24 A Google search of the phrase
"litigation financing company" returns over 100,000 hits. Clearly,
in the years since Walton began his seminars, the number of LFCs
has grown exponentially.
B. How Litigation Financing Works
A plaintiff who is short on cash is only a few keystrokes away
from what can appear to be an easy, painless solution to his
problem. A visit to ALFA-member LawCash's website features a
television ad that promises that a call to 1-800-LAW-CASH "will
get you money right now."25 Oasis Legal Finance asks "do you
need cash today?" and promises that "no one can get you cash
faster."26  The U.S. Claims site offers plaintiffs a "no risk
agreement - no recovery means no repayment."27 All of these
sites offer pre-settlement and pre-judgment cash advances, which
plaintiffs can use to cover personal expenses. These loans are
later repaid from the proceeds of the judgment or settlement, and
if the case is lost or does not settle, the plaintiff owes nothing. 28
To begin the process, a plaintiff need only fill out a short
online application. The lender then evaluates the plaintiffs case
by assessing the following factors: the presence of a skilled
plaintiffs attorney; access to the litigation file; the plaintiffs
potential liability; in car accident cases, the extent of damage to
the vehicle; "bright blood injuries;" medical bills; and a proprietary
statistical analysis of jury verdicts in comparable cases. 29 The
plaintiff must waive her attorney-client privilege in order for the
lender to contact her attorney to obtain information necessary to
assess the strength of her case. 30 If the loan is approved, the
24. Martin, Subprime, supra note 14, at 104-05.
25. LAwCASH, http://www.lawcash.net (click "LawCash As Seen On TV"
to play video on homepage) (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
26. OASIs LEGAL FINANCE, http://www.oasislegal.com (last visited Mar.
11, 2012).
27. U.S. CLAIms, http://www.usclaims.com/how-we-work (last visited
Mar. 11, 2012).
28. Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn't Gold: Analyzing
the Costs and Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 712-13
(2007).
29. Shaltiel & Cofresi, supra note 22, at 348.
30. See Barksdale, supra note 28, at 714.
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lender generates a litigation lending agreement (LLA), and once
the LLA is executed by the plaintiff and her attorney, the lender
expedites funds to the plaintiff.31 Then, the meter begins to run.
The ease and speed with which a plaintiff can enter into an
LLA has caused at least one commentator to observe that this
"instant gratification" may "encourage or facilitate poor financial
management." 32 This is particularly troubling when one compares
the plain language and short form of a typical LFC's online
application to the fine print of the multi-page LLA.33 The
LawCash online application is straightforward and, in addition to
name, address, and attorney information, requests basic
information about the plaintiffs accident claim. 34 The language in
the LLA, however, is far less clear:
The monthly use fee shall be a charge in an amount equal
to 3.10% monthly of the amount funded to me herein.
This funded amount includes the Application Fee that I
agreed to when first applying for this funding.... The
monthly use fee is charged from this date until the end of
the 5 month interval during which payment of proceeds is
made to LAWCASH. In the case of multiple fundings,
then these fees shall accrue on each funded sum from the
date of each individual funding. 3
Plaintiff/borrowers familiar with credit card agreements would be
surprised to learn that for many borrowers the above paragraph
would be the closest they would come to learning the Annual
Percentage Rate (APR) of their loan.
The federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) was enacted with
the goal of protecting consumers by giving them access to
information necessary to making informed decisions about
acquiring and using credit. 36 LFCs are not required to adhere to
31. Lauren J. Grous, Note, Causes of Action for Sale: The New Trend in
Legal Gambling, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 210 (2006).
32. Shaltiel & Cofresi, supra note 22, at 349.
33. See LawCash Advance Application, LAWCASH, http://www.law
cash.net/htm]lapplication.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2012); LawCash
Funding Agreement (Aug. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
34. See LawCash Advance Application, LAWCASH, http://www.law
cash.net/html/application.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
35. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
36. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
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TILA because they are not considered "creditors," as defined by
the Act.37 If LFCs, like credit card companies, were required to
follow TILA regulations, the APR paid by the borrower would need
to be spelled out clearly in the LLA.38 It is highly doubtful that a
plaintiff could divine the APR from the paragraph quoted above.
Given the familiarity consumers have with APRs from their
widespread use in advertising and on credit card billing
statements, it is even possible that a plaintiff/borrower could
mistake the 3.10% monthly rate for an APR. This would be a dire
mistake, as the actual APR for these loans, which would vary
greatly depending on when the loan is repaid, could amount to
anywhere between 58% and 120%.39 APRs from other LFCs can
exceed 200%.40
Given the promise of "no risk"4 1 and the fact that the plaintiff
will not be obligated to pay unless there is a judgment or
settlement, it is unlikely that the plaintiff will worry too much
about the rapidly accruing interest rate until the case has ended.
By that time, when she discovers that a large portion (or even the
entirety of her award) is payable to the LFC, she will have little
recourse. LLAs are structured so that the LFC is paid by the
plaintiffs attorney before any other funds are disbursed from the
client's portion of the settlement or judgment. 42 This is possible
because, as previously noted, the attorney, as well as the plaintiff,
is a signatory to this agreement. 43
The litigation financing industry attempts to rationalize the
enormous interest charged by claiming that it provides a much-
needed service to plaintiffs and, in so doing, LFCs assume a high
degree of risk that justifies their reaping a high profit.
Proponents of the industry argue that this funding helps "level[ ]
the playing field" for plaintiffs.44 "We look at ourselves as the
37. See id. § 1602(f).
38. Id. § 1632.
39. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
40. See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005); McLaughlin, supra note 22 at 621.
41. See, e.g., U.S. CLAims, http://www.usclaims.com/how-we-work (last
visited Mar. 11, 2012).
42. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 35.
43. See id.
44. Martin, Subprime, supra note 14, at 85.
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guys with the white hats," said industry founder Perry Walton.45
White hats and level playing fields aside, what lurks beneath is
far from commendable.
The LawCash Funding Agreement solicits the borrower's
agreement with the LFCs' justification for the interest rate
commanded. Recital C of the agreement states: "I have been
advised that I should not accept this funding if I have any other
alternative to meet my immediate economic needs. Because
LAWCASH is taking a high risk in giving me this funding, I
understand that LAWCASH may make a large profit."46
But how can we quantify, or even verify, this "high risk?"
Unlike credit cards, this is not unsecured debt; the LFC holds a
security interest in the proceeds of the lawsuit. 47  The risk,
therefore, is not whether the borrower will default on the loan, but
whether the lawsuit will result in a settlement or judgment. At
first glance, lending on the basis of a lien against litigation
proceeds may appear to be risky, but the industry's unregulated
status makes assessing the actual risk difficult.48 There are clues,
however, that the risk is far lower than portrayed by the industry.
First, LFCs carefully analyze applicants' cases and accept only
those that they deem to have a high likelihood of recovery. 49
Furthermore, because plaintiffs' attorneys who work on a
contingent fee basis screen their potential cases and accept only
those with a high likelihood of success; the LFC is actually
performing a secondarey credit determination. 50  LFCs mitigate
their risk considerably through this process. One LFC funded
only ten percent of the $250 million in loan applications it received
over a two-year period.
Perhaps the most revealing information regarding LFCs'
actual level of risk was imparted by Harvey Hirschfeld, President
of LawCash and Chairman of ALFA, in an interview with Crain's
New York Business. 52  LawCash targets lawsuits in the
45. Schmitt, supra note 4.
46. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
47. Id.
48. Martin, Subprime, supra note 14, at 101.
49. See Barksdale, supra note 28, at 726.
50. See Shaltiel & Cofresi, supra note 22, at 348.
51. Barksdale, supra note 28, at 727.
52. See Christina Merrill, Judgment Call; Firms That Lend to Personal-
Injury Plaintiffs Take Steps to Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN's N.Y.
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"midresolution" stage, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
case will be resolved in less than two years. 53 Cases in which at
least initial settlement offers have been made are much more
likely to eventually settle than are those with no offers pending.
It is doubtful that LFCs fund many "must-be-tried" cases.
LawCash limits its exposure to advancing up to ten percent of
the settlement value of a case. 54 But the one disclosure that shed
the most light on the actual level of risk involved was the
admission that LawCash "uses strict underwriting screening rules
that ensure only about 4% of the cases it advances money on are
lost in court."55 Another industry figure, Michael Douglas, CEO of
ExpertFunding.com, put his company's default even lower, at only
two percent. 56
Despite such caution (or perhaps because of it), LawCash has
prospered. The LFC projected that its case portfolio of three
million dollars in 2001 would swell to between twenty-five and
thirty million dollars in 2004. 5 More recent figures are
unavailable, and in the wake of the Crain's report, industry
leaders now find that it is wiser not to comment about their
relatively low loss history. Anecdotally, plaintiffs' lawyers in
Massachusetts note that litigation financing is booming there,
possibly due to the recent economic downturn.5 8
What seems clear is that the bloated profits available to
LFCs, and the low barriers to entry, have transformed the
business once termed "the Wild West of finance"59 from a fringe
industry into an established branch of the financing sector (albeit
one that enjoys freedom from regulation). At last count, there
Bus., Jan. 27, 2003, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK. (Jan. 29, 2001),
http://www.businessweek.com/2001/01_05/b3717011 .htm?scriptFramed.
57. Diane E. Lewis, With Interest Accident Victims Get Money from
"Advance Funders" Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2003, at C1.
58. See generally Julia Reischel, As Pre-Settlement Financing Takes
Hold in Massachusetts, Lawyers Spar Over Pros and Cons, MASS. LAW. WKLY,
July 28, 2008.
59. Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild
West of Finance Should be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 55, 55 (2004) [hereinafter Martin, Wild West] (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2012] 759
760 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:750
were at least a hundred LFCs operating in the United States, 60
and, if Google is any indicator, far more than that. As the
litigation financing industry grows, so will the number of plaintiffs
who find themselves handing over most or all of their awards in
return for having fairly brief use of a cash advance-only slightly
over a year according to LawCash's Hirschfeld.6 ' The time has
come to protect injured plaintiffs from LFCs' excesses. In order to
design a workable means of reining in these purported white hats,
it is useful to take a look at recent developments in case law and
state law.
II. THE DEBATE OVER REGULATING LITIGATION FINANCING
Commentators have proposed various approaches for dealing
with the litigation financing industry. Professor Susan Lorde
Martin has called it "a new business worth preserving" and
advocates licensing LFCs, requiring full disclosure of their fees,
and allowing competition to bring down the rates. 62 Others assert
that usury laws should not apply to LFCs because these loans
leave plaintiffs "no-worse-off' (no more likely to become a burden
on the state).63 Some caution that LLAs, which require the
signature of the plaintiffs attorney as well as a waiver of
attorney-client privilege, expose lawyers to potential ethical and
malpractice issues. 64 Still others advocate bringing LFCs under
the umbrella of TILA or crafting comprehensive regulations that
would specifically target the litigation financing industry. 65
60. Grous, supra note 31, at 236.
61. Lewis, supra note 57.
62. Martin, Usury, supra note 4, at 102; see generally Martin, Subprime,
supra note 14; Martin, Wild West, supra note 59.
63. George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation
Funding Industry: Rancman v. Iterim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REV. 753, 783 (2003).
64. Richard H. Braun, Settle Now, Pay Later: A Caution About Personal
Injury Loans, OR. ST. B. BULL. May 2002, at 9, 9; see also COMM'N ON ETHICS,
AM. BAR ASS'N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/
ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white.paper.final hod informationa
lreport.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that "lawyers must approach
transactions involving alternative litigation finance with care, mindful of
several core professional obligations" including the obligations to exercise
independent judgment, safeguard against waiver of attorney-client privilege,
and fully explain the terms and risks of funding transactions).
65. See Shaltiel & Cofresi, supra note 22; see also Martin, Subprime,
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Efforts to use the common law proscriptions against champerty
and maintenance have met with mixed results.66  After
considering attempts to challenge LLAs in state and federal
courts, this article advocates amending usury statutes to bring
LFCs within their purview. A review of recent case law will be
helpful in crafting a statute that will allow plaintiffs continued
access to funding, while protecting them from the predatory
excesses of the industry.
A. From Rancman to Odell, an Overview of Recent Caselaw
The Supreme Court of Ohio fired the first successful shot in
the battle against LFCs' triple digit interest rates. In Rancman v.
Interim Settlement Funding Corp., a plaintiff who had been
injured in a car accident received an advance from the defendant
while she awaited the resolution of her case.6 7 Within a year of
taking out the advance, she settled her case. 68  When her
settlement arrived, instead of remitting payment according to the
terms in her LLA, she tendered the principal plus eight percent
interest and filed suit seeking rescission of the LLA on grounds of
"unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable sales practices."69 The trial
court found that the transaction violated Ohio's usury statute and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.70
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the defendant
argued that the transaction was not a loan, but an "investment,"
and thus did not fall under the usury statute.7 1 The court ducked
the usury question altogether, turning instead to the doctrine of
champerty. Champerty is a form of maintenance in which
someone with no personal interest in a lawsuit gives financial
support to a plaintiff in exchange for part of the proceeds of the
litigation.72 Champerty was prohibited at common law because it
was feared that such arrangements would foster frivolous lawsuits
supra note 14, at 114-116.
66. See generally Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997);
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
67. 789 N.E.2d at 218-19.
68. Id. at 219.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Barksdale, supra note 28, at 716.
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and protracted litigation. 73 The Rancman court stated, "[i]t is
unnecessary for the resolution of this case to determine the
threshold level of risk necessary for a contingent advance to be
treated as an investment rather than a loan. The advances here
are void as champerty and maintenance regardless of whether
they are loans or investments."74
This holding sent a shockwave through the industry. After
Rancman, LFCs would continue to argue that their advances are
not loans, but rather, "investments;" however, in the future, LLAs
would also be carefully drafted to account for Rancman's change to
the legal landscape. One such LLA attempts to avoid Rancman's
pitfall by reciting:
Certain jurisdictions prohibit "Champerty". Basically,
champerty makes it illegal for an individual or company
to acquire someone else's right to sue. In entering into
this agreement, the parties acknowledge that LAWCASH
is in no way acquiring my right to sue; that I have
already started the Lawsuit; that the Lawsuit absolutely
belongs to me and no one else; and that LAWCASH will
in no way be involved in the decisions that me and my
attorney(s) make in connection with the Lawsuit. This is
an investment and not a loan, but should a Court of
competent jurisdiction construe it to be the latter, then I
agree that interest shall accrue at the maximum rate
permitted by law. 75
Notwithstanding Rancman, the promise of applying the
nineteenth century doctrine of champerty to plaintiffs/borrowers
seeking rescission of LLAs remains uncertain. Some states,
including Massachusetts and South Carolina, have expressly held
that champerty is no longer recognized.76 Others, like Florida and
Mississippi, have declined to hold that LLAs constitute
champerty.7 7 While Alabama, Minnesota and Nevada have found
LLAs to be champertous, the majority of states have not yet
73. Id.
74. 789 N.E.2d at 219.
75. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
76. Barksdale, supra note 28, at 717-720.
77. Id. at 718.
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addressed the issue.
In cases brought after Rancman, other state courts addressed
the issue that the Ohio Supreme Court sidestepped, namely, the
definition of "loan" for purposes of a usury statute. In Lawsuit
Financial, LLC v. Curry, the defendant was injured in a car
accident, sued the responsible party, and received a verdict in her
favor in the amount of twenty-seven million dollars. 79 After the
verdict, and while awaiting proceedings regarding a motion for
remittitur, the tort plaintiff sought and received three contingent
advances from Lawsuit Financial for a total of $177,500.80 The
first advance was made on April 19, 2000, and the last on October
19 of that year.81 In exchange for the use of these funds, under its
LLA, Lawsuit Financial would receive either $887,500 or ten
percent of the proceeds of the lawsuit, whichever was greater. 82
Final judgment for $4.79 million was entered on December 22,
2000.83 For the tort plaintiffs use of $177,500 over nine months,
Lawsuit Financial demanded $887,500.84
When Curry's attorney failed to remit these funds, Lawsuit
Financial sued Curry for conversion, and her attorney for abetting
that conversion.8 5 Curry moved for summary judgment, claiming
that the transactions were usurious loans with interest rates
between 200% and 370%.86 Lawsuit Financial argued that the
advance was not a loan (and therefore, not usurious) because the
lender bore at least some risk of nonpayment due to the $1.2
million Ms. Curry owed to a superior lienholder, as well as her
attorney's contingent fee.8 7 The court expressly rejected the LFC's
argument, and granted defendant Curry's motion.8 8
On appeal, the Michigan court took a closer look at the
78. Id. at 721-23.
79. 683 N.W.2d 233, 236-37 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
80. Id. at 236.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 239.
84. Id. at 236.
85. Id. The claim against Curry's attorney was dismissed because the
attorney had lawfully received the judgment proceeds and "property that
rightfully comes into a defendant's possession is not converted just because
another claims a right to it." Id. at 237.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 238.
88. Id.
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definition of loan. It stated that the word "loan" implies an
absolute right of repayment.8 9  While the plaintiff LFC argued
that the transaction was a contingent advance, the court
concluded that "[d]espite that language in the agreements ... the
right to repayment was absolute because the parties entered into
those agreements long after the defendants in the underlying
personal injury suit admitted liability and after the jury returned
a verdict of $27 million in damages." 90 The court further observed
that Curry was certain to recover some damages and that the
agreement did not make plain that Lawsuit Financial would
receive nothing unless Curry recovered over $2.3 million (an
amount sufficient to pay off the superior lienholder as well as her
attorney's contingent fee).91 Judgment for the defendant/borrower
was affirmed, and the LFC was barred by Michigan's usury
statute from recovering interest, fees, late charges, and attorney's
fees. 92
What seemed clear after Lawsuit Financial LLC was that
courts would make a fact-specific inquiry in determining whether
a contingent advance is a loan. New York followed this path in
Echeverria v. Lindner, when the Supreme Court of Nassau County
assessed whether a LawCash advance was a loan.93 The plaintiff
in Echeverria, a day laborer, was severely injured in a workplace
accident. 94  He was not covered by his employer's worker's
compensation insurance. 95  In order to pay for the surgery
necessitated by his injuries, the plaintiff borrowed $25,000 from
LawCash at the rate of 3.85% per month, compounded monthly.96
After three of the defendants settled and the fourth defaulted, a
hearing was held to assess damages. 97 The plaintiff argued that
by failing to provide him with Worker's Compensation insurance,
89. Id. at 239.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 240.
92. Id.
93. 7 Misc. 3d 1019(A), No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005).
94. Id.
95. Id.at *2.
96. Id. The interest on this advance accrued at a rate of $48.94 per day.
Mr. Echeverria, prior to his injury, earned between seventy-five and eighty
dollars per day. Id. at *4.
97. Id. at *1.
LITIGATION LOANSHARKS
the defendants forced him to seek a lender of last resort to pay for
his medical bills, and thus the cost of his funding should be
included in his damages. 98
Referencing Rancman, the Echeverria court noted that while
the transaction in that suit was champertous in Ohio, due to a
difference in the New York champerty statute, the Echeverria
advance did not constitute champerty. 99 Unlike Ohio, which
tolerates "no lien . .. which . .. encourages, promotes, or extends
litigation," New York law permits assignments as long as their
primary purpose is profit, not bringing suit.100 However, the New
York court looked askance at the argument that LLAs are "an
investment" rather than a loan, stating:
While there may be no cap on the return on an
investment, most investors do not get to set the amount of
that return. Usually, either the party receiving the
investment tells the investor what the rate of return will
be, or nobody knows. In this latter case investors will
forecast their return, but they can't demand it. Banks set
the return they expect from their loans, through interest
rates, which is more comparable to what we have here.101
In finding that the transaction was a loan, the court stated that "it
is ludicrous to consider this transaction anything else but a loan
unless the court was to consider it legalized gambling." 02 The
court further noted that, because the case at bar was a strict
liability labor law action, there was a "very low probability" that
the plaintiff would not recover; thus, LawCash bore almost no
risk, rendering the transaction less a gamble than a "sure
thing."103
Mindful that LawCash "justified" its high interest rates by
claiming to bear a high risk, the court held that LawCash was
lending money at an "obviously usurious rate."1 04  The court
vitiated the agreement and held that LawCash could recover only
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *6.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *5 n.1.
102. Id. at *8.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *1.
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the principal and costs of the transaction, as well as a (non-
usurious) interest rate of 16% per annum.1 05 Further, these funds
would be recoverable from the tort defendant because it was the
defendant's failure to furnish Worker's Compensation insurance
that caused the plaintiff to take out the loan.106
After Echeverria, the question in similar cases would turn
from, "is this champerty?" to, "what is a loan?" In particular,
courts would consider the actual risk involved in these putative
high risk investments to determine whether the advances were
truly contingent and whether the LFC bore any significant risk of
nonpayment.
The Circuit Court of Michigan addressed this issue in Vinch v.
Lawsuit Financing, Inc., where the plaintiff argued that the
defendants' access to documents regarding the underlying
litigation allowed them to be assured that their advance would be
repaid.10 7 The defendant LFC argued that, at the time it entered
the agreement, the outcome of the underlying litigation was
unknown. 0 8  Under the terms of the LLA, in exchange for an
advance of $10,000, the LFC would receive 100% of the plaintiffs
recovery up to a maximum of $50,000.109 Eleven months after
signing the LLA, the plaintiff received an arbitration award of
only $65,867.15.110
In enforcing the LLA, the Vinch court referenced Lawsuit
Financial, LLC v. Curry, holding that the transaction was a
"contingent advance," and not a loan."' The Curry court had
earlier said that "'the hallmark of a loan is the absolute right to
repayment.'ll2 The Michigan court distinguished Vinch from
Curry because a verdict had already been rendered in the
plaintiffs litigation in Curry, whereas liability was still at issue in
the underlying case in Vinch at the time the advance was made." 3
Therefore, because there was still a possibility that the defendant
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id.
107. No. 2004-3963-CK, slip op. at 2-3 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 26, 2005).
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id. at 4-5.
112. Id. at 4. (quoting Lawsuit Financial, LCC v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233,
239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)).
113. Id.
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LFC in Vinch would recover nothing under the LIA, the court
held that the LLA was a "contingency agreement and not a
loan."1 1 4 The careful construction of the LLA as a "contingency
agreement" put the transaction outside the reach of Michigan's
usury statute, which, under Michigan law, required a transaction
to be absolutely repayable in order for the statute to apply.
It seemed that Perry Walton's scheme, propounded to would-
be litigation funders at a number of seminars, would prove to be a
workable end-run around the usury statute, as long as the
circumstances of the transactions were such that, at least
arguably, the LFC bore some risk that its advance would not be
repaid.
Walton's brainchild would see its next test in Fausone v. U.S.
Claims, Inc.115 The plaintiff in Fausone was injured when the
bicycle she was riding was struck by a dump truck.116 During the
pendency of her litigation, the plaintiff sought several advances in
small amounts from different LFCs.1 17  She then contacted
defendant U.S. Claims and consolidated her earlier loans at more
favorable terms.1 1 8 She later sought additional advances from the
defendant, for a total amount of $30,000.119 The plaintiff settled
her personal injury claim for an amount in excess of $200,000.120
According to her repayment schedule at the time, she then owed
U.S. Claims $50,937. 121
The plaintiff instructed her attorney not to remit payment to
the defendant, who then initiated arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the LLA. 122  In response, the plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment in Florida that the LLA was unconscionable,
that the interest rate was usurious and that she should not be
compelled to arbitrate. 123  The trial court stayed her claim,
pending arbitration. 124 Despite being offered the opportunity to
114. Id. at 5.
115. 915 So.2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
116. Id. at 627.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 628.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 629.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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appear via telephone, the plaintiff failed to participate in the
arbitration and U.S. Claims was awarded $72,117.125 Plaintiff
first sought to vacate the arbitration award, but then declined to
proceed with her motion to vacate. 126 After the court confirmed
the arbitration award, the plaintiff appealed.127
Noting that there were few, if any issues preserved for appeal,
and no demonstration by the plaintiff that the LLA could be
invalidated under Florida law, there was little the court could
do.128 However, the court was clearly uncomfortable with the
concept of litigation funding, explaining that the opinion would
delve into the facts of the case in some detail "because this method
of litigation funding may warrant regulation in Florida." 29
The Fausone court noted the need for personal injury
plaintiffs to be able to access money to support themselves and
their families while litigation is pending, but made clear its
concern that plaintiffs could be victimized by LFCs charging
interest rates that are greatly in excess of their level of risk. 30
Referring to U.S. Claims, the court stated, "a company that only
loaned money when it was secured by high-grade personal injury
claims would seem to be able to charge a lower interest rate than
some of the rates described in this opinion, even when the
arrangement is a nonrecourse loan."'31
The court expressed similar displeasure with the mandatory
arbitration clause, (which is common to many LLAs), stating:
The purchase agreement in this case is one-sided and
designed to prevent a Florida citizen from having access
to a local court or another local dispute resolution forum.
Such agreements create confusion concerning the party
who actually owns and controls the lawsuit, and creates
risks that the attorney-client privilege will be waived
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The court noted that throughout the arbitration proceeding, the
plaintiff had not been represented by a lawyer but had instead been assisted
by a nonlawyer doing business under the name, "Cheaper than a Lawyer."
Id. A dubious moniker, given the outcome of this case.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 627.
130. Id. at 630.
131. Id.
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unintentionally.132
The court ended its opinion by calling on the legislature to
"examine this industry to determine whether Florida's citizens are
in need of any statutory protection."1 33
While seemingly another victory for the LFCs, Fausone can be
seen as a warning to the litigation funding industry. Confronted
with perhaps not the most sympathetic plaintiff, in affirming the
award to the defendant, the Florida court still went to great
lengths to express its concerns regarding litigation funding, and
its hope that the Florida state legislature would rein in the
excesses of the industry.134
Perhaps Walton's invention is not entirely bullet-proof. North
Carolina, a state with one of the more consumer-protective usury
statutes, would see the next challenge to LFCs. In Odell v. Legal
Bucks, LLC, a plaintiff injured in a car accident expected to
realize at least $30,000 from her claim, but as with many personal
injury plaintiffs, she had an immediate need for a small amount of
money to tide her over until her case was settled. 135 The plaintiff
sought $3000 from the defendant LFC, and signed an LLA on
March 28, 2003, in which she agreed to the following repayment
schedule: $4200 prior to July 1, 2003, or after that date, $4200
plus $234 for each month thereafter until the advance was repaid,
up to a maximum of $9750 (which would amount to 325% of the
principal advanced). 136  As with other LLAs, if the plaintiff
recovered nothing in her suit, she would not owe the defendant
LFC anything.137
The tort plaintiffs claim was settled in May 2005 for $18,000;
at that time she owed the LFC $9582-just shy of the contractual
maximum. 138 Instead of repaying the loan, the plaintiff filed a
claim against the defendant LFC alleging, inter alia, that the LLA
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 627-630. After all, the plaintiff there had sought and received
a number of advances and failed to participate in the arbitration of her claim.
Id. at 627, 629.
135. 665 S.E.2d 767, 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
136. Id. at 770-71.
137. Id. at 771.
138. Id.
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was both champertous and usurious. 139 Both the plaintiff and the
defendant filed motions for summary judgment and the trial court
found for the defendant LFC.140 The court awarded the defendant
$29,250 plus post-judgment interest, and the plaintiff appealed.141
On appeal, the plaintiff first argued that the LLA was
champertous because it gave the LFC a level of control over
borrowers' lawsuits. 142 The defendant appeared to accede to this
reasoning when its representative testified that the LFC had
reduced the amount of its lien in prior cases in order to facilitate
settlement when parties were otherwise unable to reach
agreement due to the size of the LFC's lien.143 However, the court
held that there is a distinction between the assignment of a claim
for personal injury and the assignment of the proceeds of the
claim, and that an assignment of the proceeds does not give the
assignee sufficient control over the case to constitute
champerty.144
The plaintiff fared better with her second argument, however,
that the advance fell within the ambit of the North Carolina usury
statute, despite the fact that repayment was contingent upon
recovery on her claim.145 To prevail on a claim of usury in North
Carolina, a plaintiff must prove four elements:
1. A loan or forbearance of money, either express or
implied.
2. An understanding between the parties that the
principal shall be or may be returned.
3. That for such loan or forbearance a greater profit than
is authorized by law shall be paid or agreed to be paid.
4. That the contract is entered into with an intention to
violate the law. 146
139. Id.
140. Id. at 772.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 774. The plaintiff argued that control was established because
borrowers would likely reject any settlement offer that amounted to less than
the amount owed to the LFC. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 776-77.
146. Id. at 778.
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The defendant LFC, relying on early North Carolina case law,
argued that usury is involved only in transactions where the
obligation to make repayment is not subject to any contingency.147
Under the defendant's theory, North Carolina usury law required
an absolute obligation to repay the lender.148 However, the court
cited cases from the same period defining the second element of
usury as "[a]n understanding between the parties that the
principal shall be or may be returned."l 49 The court noted that,
unlike the usury statutes in some other states, North Carolina's
statute specifically covered loans in which repayment may be
conditional.1 50  The court further referenced the legislature's
inclusion in the statute of both the terms "loan" and "advance" to
imply "at least two distinct types of transaction."' 5 ' In holding
that the LLA was a usurious transaction, the appellate court
noted that the contract did not excuse the plaintiff/borrower from
paying the amount owed, but simply provided that if she were to
recover less than the sum advanced, the "'money owed' under the
Agreement would be as little as zero dollars."1 52
Thus, with that neat bit of linguistic gymnastics, the court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant and found the LLA to be invalid and unenforceable.153
Reading between the lines of the opinion, it seems clear that the
North Carolina court was bending over backward to read the
usury statute in a manner that would protect the plaintiff from
the excesses of LFCs.
More recently, the usurious nature of LLAs was addressed by
a U.S. Bankruptcy Court. There, a bankruptcy trustee sought
authorization to compromise a Chapter 7 debtor's personal injury
claim. 154 In the wake of an auto accident, the debtor had taken
four advances from Pre-Settlement Finance ("PSF") totaling
$18,600. 155 By the time her case settled, the debtor owed PSF
over $32,000, with interest calculated at an annual rate of
147. Id. at 777.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 778.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 781.
154. In Re Minor, 443 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2011).
155. Id.
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42.5%.156 The bankruptcy court refused to find that the
settlement was reasonable and in the best interests of the
bankruptcy estate, stating that "[e]ven outside bankruptcy, the
validity of PSF's legal argument is highly suspect for at least three
reasons": first, the LLA was ambiguous as to whether the
transaction was an assignment or a loan; second, New York
courts, following Echeverria look to the "underlying essence of the
transaction" in determining whether an agreement is usurious;
and third, the LLA "suggests the potential defense of
unconscionability."l 57  Noting that "[o]n their face, the pre-
settlement loan agreements are troublesome and perhaps even
predatory," and describing the debtor as "an individual with
limited income and few resources," the court invoked the doctrine
of unconscionability as "primarily a means with which to protect
the commercially illiterate consumer beguiled into a grossly unfair
bargain by a deceptive vendor or finance company."1 51 It is
unclear whether an Article III court would take up
unconscionability in a future challenge to an LLA, but it seems
likely that pro-consumer bankruptcy courts will view these
lending agreements with a jaundiced eye.
In reviewing the landscape from Rancman to In Re Minor,
two features stand out: the poor fit of champerty as a means to
void LLAs, and the judiciary's disdain for these loans. Perhaps
the specter of greedy LFCs charging injured plaintiffs triple-digit
interest rates for loans to meet their basic financial needs while
they await justice is so distasteful that judges are willing to be
creative in interpreting usury statutes. Several courts have called
for legislators to address the problem. Legislation would ideally
give plaintiffs some measure of protection while also giving courts
clearer guidelines, thus avoiding the need for creative
interpretation. Commentators have called for the litigation
financing industry to be regulated since at least 2004.159
Unfortunately, the success of the litigation financing industry in
avoiding regulation makes clear that any proposed comprehensive
regulatory scheme would face a pitched battle from deep-pocketed
interests.
156. Id. at 284-85.
157. Id. at 287.
158. Id. at 287-88 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. See, e.g., Martin, Wild West, supra note 59, at 77.
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B. Regulation Proposed and Avoided
Litigation financing is a relatively new industry, but one that
is rapidly growing. As an unregulated industry, there are no
reliable figures available with which to gauge the size of the
industry, its level of risk or its profitability.160  To date, both
borrowers and judges have had to take on faith LFCs' assertions
that they assume a "high risk" and thus should be allowed to
"make a large profit."1 6 1 This assertion, absent figures to back it
up, is meaningless. What is high risk? In order to justify triple
digit interest rates, well in excess of those charged for unsecured
credit card debt, one would surmise that the rate of default would
be higher than the two to four percent quoted by industry leaders
in the mainstream press. 6 2
Several commentators have called for greater transparency in
the industry. This could be accomplished in several ways.
Professor Susan Lorde Martin, who has written a number of
articles supporting litigation financing, suggested amending the
federal Truth in Lending Act to bring LFCs within its purview.163
This could be accomplished by expanding the statute's definition
of "debt" to include contingent obligations when financing is made
to support litigation. 164 Assuming this could be accomplished,165
it would force LFCs to make full disclosure of the costs involved in
entering an LLA.166  Unfortunately, while greater clarity is
always welcome, it is doubtful that this measure would truly
protect plaintiffs. A plaintiff who is in such dire need as to be
willing to borrow from a lender of "last resort"1 67 is unlikely to be
160. A New York Times article states that the industry "lends plaintiffs
more than $100 million a year," and refers to LFCs' claims to losing money
"in a significant share of cases, from 5 to 20 percent," but notes that "there is
no way to verify those numbers." Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add
New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 16, 2011, at Al.
161. See LawCash Funding Agreement supra note 35.
162. See Merrill, supra note 52; France, supra note 56.
163. Martin, Wild West, supra note 59, at 69.
164. Id.
165. Several years after Martin's proposal, TILA still does not cover
LFCs. Id. at 68-69.
166. Martin, supra note 59, at 69.
167. One LFC cautions in its agreement that "selling a portion of the
Proceeds to Purchaser is potentially expensive and should only be used as a
last resort . . ." CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement
(April 10, 2009) (on file with author).
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deterred by the sort of fine print which is included in credit card
statements.
Authors Shaltiel and Cofresi proposed the Litigation Lending
for Personal Needs Act (LLPNA), a comprehensive regulatory
framework that would require LFCs to be licensed and post a
bond. 168 The LLPNA would give plaintiff/borrowers a three-day
cooling-off period and the option to pay off all or part of the loan
prior to the resolution of their case. 169 It is worth noting that at
least some LFCs already provide such options to their
borrowers.1 70 The LLPNA would also limit the fees charged to
either a fixed interest calculated over the life of the loan (not in
excess of state usury law) or a contingency fee not to exceed
twenty-five percent.' 7 ' This last measure would certainly provide
more protection to borrowers, but would require each state to pass
a comprehensive act targeting the LFC industry.
In the years since Shaltiel and Cofresi proposed their model
act, there has been no legislative movement toward true
regulation. Instead, LFCs have lobbied for self-regulation,
advocating licensing and disclosure requirements that amount to
mere window dressing, yet firmly opposing attempts to place a
meaningful cap on interest rates. 172 Perhaps the deep pockets of
the LFCs are the reason why few legislators have introduced their
own bills to regulate this industry. In Texas alone, legal finance
groups spent between $360,000 and $1,000,000 in a single year to
oppose a bill that would have subjected litigation financing to the
same standards as other loans.173  By contrast, disadvantaged
plaintiffs are hardly a powerful lobbying force.
Concerns that LFCs were exploiting consumers did cause
former New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to take a
closer look at the practices of the litigation financing industry.174
168. Shaltiel and Cofresi, supra note 22, at 351.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., U.S. Claims Purchase Agreement (May 13, 2009) (on file
with author).
171. Shaltiel and Cofesi, supra note 22, at 355.
172. See Appelbaum, supra note 160.
173. Benjamin Hallman & Caitlin Ginley, CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY, Betting on
Justice: States are Battleground in Drive to Regulate Lawsuit Funding, NAT'L
L.REV. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/betting-justice-
states-are-battleground-drive-to-regulate-lawsuit-funding.
174. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen., Personal Injury
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While his investigation of one LFC did not result in charges of
wrongdoing, the Attorney General "determined that more could be
done to protect consumers." 175  In response to Spitzer's
investigation, a consortium of LFCs formed the American Legal
Finance Association ("ALFA"), a trade association. 176 Following
the investigation, the New York Attorney General's office entered
into an "Assurance of Discontinuance" with the group of LFCs
that then comprised ALFA.177 The details of the Assurance will
be discussed infra. Time would tell whether that agreement
would protect plaintiff/borrowers, or merely allow LFCs to operate
free from regulation while circumventing the spirit, if not the
letter, of the agreement.
C. The Agreement with the New York Attorney General
Spitzer's investigation, pursued under Executive Law section
63-12 (authorizing the Attorney General to investigate repeated
fraudulent or illegal acts), was prompted by concerns that
consumers could not adequately understand the terms of the LLAs
that they were signing.1 78  The LLAs could be confusing to
plaintiff/borrowers for several reasons: some failed to provide an
APR or a breakdown of the amount owed depending upon when
repayment was made, the documents were not always translated
into the native language of the borrower, and an opportunity for
the borrower to cancel the transaction within a reasonable time
was not routinely provided. 179
Under New York state law, in cases where the Attorney
General has authority to bring a civil action, he may, at his
discretion, opt to accept an assurance of discontinuation of the act
that constitutes a violation of the law, from any person or persons
Cash Advance Firms Agree to Reforms (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/personal-injury-cash-advance-firms-agree-
reforms.
175. Dee McAree, Legal Cash-Advance Businesses Form Group, NAT'L L.
J., Mar. 28, 2005, at 4.
176. Id.
177. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., Bureau of Consumer Frauds & Prot.,
Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15) (Feb. 17,
2005) at 1, 3 [hereinafter Assurance of Discontinuance].
178. See id. at 3.
179. Id.
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engaged in such an act.18 0  Spitzer accepted an agreement with
nine LFCs to "settle and resolve" his concerns "without admitting
that the Companies have violated any law or otherwise committed
any wrongful or improper act. . . ." 181
The Assurance of Discontinuance provides, inter alia, that
LLAs would disclose the APR, display the total amount to be
repaid broken down in six month increments, include a five-day
right to rescission, and be translated into the borrower's native
language.182 The agreement also stated that "[n]o contract may
require mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes under the
contract."1 83  In accord with section 63(15), which provides for
"voluntary payment by the alleged violator of the reasonable costs
and disbursements incurred by the attorney general during the
course of his investigation," the settling LFCs agreed to pay a total
of $45,000 in costs to the state. 184
The newly minted industry group, ALFA, followed Spitzer's
announcement of the agreement by trumpeting it as an effort to
raise industry standards by embracing "best practices." 8 5 Harvey
Hirschfeld, Chairman of ALFA and President of LawCash (one of
the Assurance of Discontinuance signatories), bemoaned the
"concern in the industry that people are charging exorbitant rates
and giving the industry a bad name."1 86 Hirschfeld described the
litigation financing industry as "an industry of last resort for
people who have exhausted all financial means and cannot borrow
from family, friends or traditional lenders."1 87 In defending LFCs
as a resource for needy plaintiffs, he noted that about seventy
percent of LawCash borrowers sought their loans to halt a
foreclosure or eviction.188
Trade group ALFA trumpeted the agreement as "the first
agreement of its kind in the nation" and vowed "[t]o establish and
maintain the highest ethical standards and fair business practices
180. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(15) (Consol. 2009).
181. Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 177, at 3-4
182. Press Release, supra note 174.
183. Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 177, at 6.
184. See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63(15); Assurance of Discontinuance, supra
note 177, at 7; Press Release, supra note 174.
185. See McAree, supra note 175.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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within the legal funding industry."l 89  It seemed that after
entering the Assurance of Discontinuance, LFCs, or at least those
LFCs that had joined ALFA, would work to repair the industry's
image. An advertisement on the ALFA website encourages
attorneys to look for the ALFA logo, stating "If your funding
source does not display the ALFA logo, it is not a member. Be
sure. Be safe."' 90 The ad urges lawyers to "[o]nly trust an ALFA
member company" because "member companies adhere to best
practices for the industry according to guidelines created with the
New York Attorney General." 91
It would appear that, according to ALFA's ads, Spitzer's
reforms would extend beyond New York citizens to benefit all
plaintiff-borrowers. But would this fast-growing, highly profitable
industry change its ways and treat its borrowers fairly? Or would
the changes be merely cosmetic, and the heralded agreement only
a means to forestall true regulation? Some of the answers can be
found in an overview of the industry today and a close look at a
few sample LLAs.
III. LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE WAKE OF THE DISCONTINUANCE
AGREEMENT WITH THE NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL
ALFA membership has now grown to include twenty-one
LFCs, including CaseFunding, U.S. Claims, and Hirschfeld's
LawCash.192 The industry continues to thrive yet, as evidenced by
the case law in Part II, challenges to LLAs continue to be brought,
and won. In the Echeverria opinion, which Professor Susan Lorde
Martin termed "an excellent example of judicial antipathy to
litigation financing arrangements,"193 the court called upon the
New York Attorney General to go further and issue an "opinion
letter," rather than merely allow the LFCs to operate pursuant to
an "agreement" that makes their operation safer for consumers. 194
189. Facts about ALFA, AM. LEG. FIN. Ass'N, http://www.americanlegal
fin.com/FactsAboutALFA.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
190. ALFA Advertisements, AM. LEG. FIN. Ass'N, http://www.americanlegal
fin.com/press/ALFA%20NY%2OLaw%2OJournal%20ad.pdf (last visited May
9, 2012).
191. Id.
192. ALFA Member Companies, AM. LEG. FIN. Ass'N, http://www.american
legalfin.com/OfficersAndMembers.asp (last visited May 9, 2012).
193. Martin, Subprime, supra note 14, at 93.
194. Echeverria v. Lindner, 7 Misc.3d 1019(A), No. 018666/2002, 2005
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No such opinion letter issued.
The requirements outlined in the Assurance of
Discontinuance that LLAs grant a five-day right of rescission,
contain no mandatory arbitration clause, and clearly state the
APR while displaying the total repayment amounts at six-month
intervals, would be the best (and only) protection for plaintiffs who
sought loans from these lenders of last resort. Unfortunately,
however, these requirements are not followed as closely as ALFA's
advertising would suggest, and at least one LFC would find a
cunning way to twist one of the Attorney General's terms to wring
even greater profits from its hapless borrowers.
A. A Closer Look at Litigation Lending Agreements
Despite the arrival of ALFA, and the industry-image polishing
that it promised, the as-yet-unregulated litigation financing
industry still lacks the degree of transparency necessary for a
complete overview. Professor Martin explained that a comparison
of LFCs to other subprime lending industries cannot be
performed, because LFCs are privately held and members of
ALFA were "unwilling to provide information about the interest
rate they charge, how they assess risk, how often they do not
recover funds advanced or any other information that would allow
a realistic assessment about whether or not they are overcharging
their borrowers." 195
Fortunately, however, some LLAs themselves provide a
glimpse into current industry practice. The view is not pretty.
The author reviewed three such agreements (with personal
information redacted) from ALFA members CaseFunding, U.S.
Claims and LawCash.
In comparing the LLAs and the degrees to which they follow
the Assurance of Discontinuance, it is important to note that the
agreement with the New York Attorney General applies
specifically to contracts with New York residents.196 The sample
LLAs referenced here were entered into by borrowers who are
residents of other states. However, ALFA advertising indicates
that their members adhere to the guidelines created by the New
WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
195. Martin, Subprime, supra note 14, at 101.
196. Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 177, at 4.
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York Attorney General.197
The one requirement that was included in all three LLAs was
the five-day right of rescission. Although it is unknown how often
a borrower actually exercises this right, it was plainly stated in
each of the sample LLAs.19 8
Strict adherence to the ALFA guidelines and Attorney
General agreement disappears when it comes to the Assurance of
Discontinuance's prohibition against mandatory arbitration
clauses. The U.S. Claims LLA is the only one of the three with no
mention of arbitration. 199 CaseFunding does not call for
mandatory arbitration, and its LLA contain choice of law and
choice of venue clauses indicating that New York will have
exclusive jurisdiction. 200  However, that same document also
provides that "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this contract ... may be settled by final, binding
arbitration. .. ."201 LawCash goes the furthest in flouting the
Assurance of Discontinuance's terms. Its LLA states that "at the
sole and exclusive option of LAWCASH, any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this contract . .. shall be settled by
final, binding arbitration. . . ."202 While the same LLA provides
for the application of New York law and jurisdiction in a New
York court, one must assume that if arbitration can be compelled
at the sole and exclusive option of the LFC, arbitration is, in
reality, mandatory.
Both CaseFunding and U.S. Claims express the interest to be
charged on an annualized basis and clearly display the APR (fifty-
one percent and twenty-seven percent, respectively).203 The
LawCash agreement, however, contains absolutely no mention of
197. See ALFA Advertisements, AM. LEG. FIN. Ass'N, http://www.american
legalfin.com/press/ALFA%20NY%20Law%2OJournal%20ad.pdf (last visited
May 9, 2012).
198. CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement, supra note
167; LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33; U.S. Claims Purchase
Agreement, supra note 170.
199. See U.S. Claims Purchase Agreement, supra note 170.
200. See CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement, supra
note 167.
201. Id.
202. See LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
203. CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement, supra note
167; U.S. Claims Purchase Agreement, supra note 170.
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an APR.204 Moreover, the language regarding the cost is
purposely obtuse. The term "interest rate" does not appear in this
clause. Instead, the interest is referred to as an "accrued use fee,
compounded monthly," and a "monthly use fee" of 3.10%.205 It is
impossible, with the information provided, for any
plaintiff/borrower to determine the APR.
The impossibility of this determination illustrates how
LawCash turned a seemingly innocuous requirement of the
Assurance of Discontinuation, into a trap for unwary borrowers.
The Assurance of Discontinuation further calls for an itemization
of all fees, with the total amount to be repaid broken down into
six-month increments. 206 Both the U.S. Claims and CaseFunding
LLAs express these payoff amounts in a straightforward manner,
with both LFCs breaking the payoff numbers down further into
monthly totals (thus meeting both the letter and the spirit of the
agreement with the Attorney General).207 LawCash, however,
twists the purpose behind these six-month "windows," to yield not
the intended transparency for the consumer but a lucrative hidden
fee for the LFC. In the sample LLA, the windows appear as
follows:
Date of Payment to LAWCASH Amount Due
If payment is made on 2/26/2010 $64,512.73
If payment is made on 8/26/2010 $75,377.88
If payment is made on 2/26/2011 $87,896.38
If payment is made on 8/26/2011** $102,699.78
**After this date, monthly fees continue to accrue until
LAWCASH is paid in full. This chart includes example
dates only. Dates in-between and after those shown may
reflect other pay-off amounts. Always contact LAWCASH
for your exact pay-off amount.208
The language following the asterisks is deceptively simple. A fair
reading would suggest that interest and payoff amounts are
204. See LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
205. Id.
206. Press Release, supra note 174.
207. See CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement, supra
note 167; U.S. Claims Purchase Agreement, supra note 170.
208. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
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calculated on a linear basis and that payments made between the
window dates will be pro-rated. The clue to how LawCash's
"windows" trap works is contained in this clause, which follows
one paragraph later: "[t]he monthly use fee is charged from [the
date of the advance] until the end of the 5 month interval during
which payment of proceeds is made to LawCash."209 This carefully
buried language derogates from the seemingly clear disclosure
page. In effect, what happens is this: if the borrower pays
anytime during the first six-month period, she will pay the
amount contained within the "6 month" window. If she pays one
day later (thus tipping her over into the "12 month" window), she
will owe the entire amount in that window, just as if she had had
the use of the money for twelve months, rather than six months
and one day. And the difference in the effective interest rate is
stunning. A plaintiff in this scenario, who borrowed $47,000,
would repay $64,512 on the last day of the six-month window, and
$75,377 just one day later, taking the APR from 74.5% to nearly
120%.210 Because the APR is wholly dependent on the timing of
when the loan is repaid, it is impossible for a plaintiff/borrower (or
her attorney or accountant) to calculate the APR at the time she
signs the LLA.
There are other terms in the reviewed LLAs that also violate
the spirit, if not the letter, of the ALFA guidelines and Assurance
of Discontinuation. For example, both the CaseFunding and
LawCash LLAs contain waivers of any defense to payment.2 11
Additionally, CaseFunding's LLA calls for liquidated damages of
two times the amount due in the event that the plaintiff/borrower
breaches the agreement. 212 LawCash's LLA contains an express
waiver of the right to consolidate actions or participate in a class
*213
action.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. See id.
211. CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement, supra note
167; LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
212. CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement, supra note
167.
213. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33. By contrast, the U.S.
Claims LLA contains none of these provisions and, in fact, expressly allows
the borrower to "pay USC money to reduce the amount of USC's Interest"
prior to final verdict, award, or settlement. U.S. Claims Purchase
Agreement, supra note 170.
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Finally, there are two curious terms buried in the language of
the LawCash LLA that raise questions regarding the lengths to
which LawCash would go to collect from a borrower in the event
the plaintiff/borrower's lawsuit were not successful. LawCash's
LLA, in contrast to those of U.S. Claims and CaseFunding, defines
"proceeds" as including "any money paid as a consequence of the
Lawsuit, whether by settlement, judgment or otherwise." 214 Just
what is covered by the words "consequence" and "otherwise?" If a
plaintifflborrower were to, say, write a book about the lawsuit she
lost, could LawCash collect from her? The LawCash LLA goes on
to state that, in the event that the lawsuit is not successful, it will
not attempt to collect directly from the borrower. 215  It never
explains what indirect collection might be.
Despite the promise of ALFA's advertising that its members
"adhere to best practices for the industry according to guidelines
created with the New York Attorney General,"216 it is clear that
there is still reason for concern that plaintiffs are being preyed
upon by LFCs. It is equally clear that, instead of "establish[ing]
and maintain[ing] the highest ethical standards and fair business
practices within the legal funding industry," ALFA members are
working to avoid regulation and maintain astronomical interest
rates. 217
B. Industry Practices Today
When Professor Martin wrote about the nascent litigation
financing industry,218 she touted LFCs as fulfilling a need, and
urged that, rather than "regulate the litigation financing industry
out of business, whether through legislation or court decisions,"
we should instead encourage competition as the means of lowering
costs.219 While Martin also advocated requiring greater
transparency within the industry, she opposed bringing LLAs
within the purview of usury statutes claiming that this would
214. LawCash Funding Agreement, supra note 33.
215. Id.
216. ALFA Advertisements, AM. LEG. FIN. ASS'N, http://www.americanlegal
fin.com/press/ALFA%20NY%2OLaw%2OJournal%20ad.pdf (last visited May
9, 2012).
217. Facts about ALFA, AM. LEG. FIN. Ass'N, http://www.americanlegal
fin.com/FactsAboutALFA.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
218. Martin, Wild West, supra note 59, passim.
219. See id. at 77.
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limit funds available to plaintiffs, presumably because the risk
involved is so high that no one would offer these loans at lower
rates. 220
Martin's assertion, however, is not factually grounded. Aside
from claiming high risk, LFCs have not, to date, provided any
means of assessing their actual level of risk. With industry
leaders admitting default rates between two and four percent, it is
difficult to justify allowing this industry to operate free from the
constraints of usury laws.
Professor Martin continues to maintain that LFCs are part of
a subprime industry that should be exempt from usury laws.221
However, after LFCs began to scrupulously guard information
regarding their actual level of risk (industry leaders no longer
comment for attribution on the subject), Martin shifted her
justification for the usury exemption from the LFCs' practices, to
their borrowers' actions. 222  "[S]tate legislatures should define
litigation financing as investments, not loans, to eliminate the
threat of plaintiffs/borrowers accepting funds and then reneging,
arguing usury, on their agreements to pay the stipulated fees out
of the proceeds of their lawsuits."223
One would think after reading Professor Martin's apologia for
the LFCs that the problem here is plaintiffs who will not pay up.
If that were the case, the litigation financing industry would be
shrinking, not expanding. Rather, it is the disadvantaged
plaintiffs, with no lobbyists or political power, who need
protecting, not the LFCs.
ALFA has proven itself to be a powerful lobbying force. In the
wake of Rancman, ALFA brought that force to bear on the Ohio
state legislature, and succeeded in getting legislation passed to
overturn that case's bar on litigation funding.224 ALFA issued a
press release trumpeting the new law as a measure that "like
ALFA's own internal 'Best Practices' policy, is geared to further
220. Id.
221. See generally Martin, Subprime, supra note 14.
222. See id. at 115.
223. Id.
224. See Ohio Legislation, Am. LEG. FIN. ASS'N (June 7, 2008),
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/PressReleases.asp. Unlike Texas, Ohio does
not require disclosure of money spent on lobbying efforts. Hallman & Ginley,
supra note 173.
2012]1 783
784 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:750
protect consumers from legal financing companies that do not
follow industry standards."225  But when the LFC run by the
Chairman of ALFA fails to follow the guidelines embraced in
ALFA advertising, it is hard to believe that "consumer protection"
is at the heart of ALFA's efforts.
The litigation financing industry's reaction to attempts to rein
in its excesses have been consistent. There is no greater
transparency today than there was when Perry Walton made his
first loan. When courts in states like Ohio or North Carolina rule
for the plaintiff over an LLA, instead of complying with that
state's law, LFCs either opt not to do business there, 226 or lobby
for "self-regulation" that would preserve the status quo. 227
Competition has not served to bring down costs for the simple
reason that borrowers need adequate information in order to
choose between vendors. When APRs are difficult, if not
impossible, to calculate, and terms vary greatly from LLA to LLA,
there is no meaningful way for a plaintiff to comparison shop.
Even the language used in LFC advertising is designed to
mislead plaintiff/borrowers. On their websites, LFCs offer
"litigation funding" or "plaintiff financing," words that would
certainly indicate "loan" to a plaintiff (as opposed to "investment").
When it is time to sign on the dotted line, however, the LLA will
be titled a "contingent proceeds purchase agreement"228 or some
similarly obscure term. The word "lender" will not appear in the
LLA, and instead, the LFC will be dubbed the "purchaser."229
These contracts are carefully drafted to sidestep usury statutes,
but their language further serves to keep their borrowers in the
dark. "Litigation funding" is not lending in the same way that
"gaming" is not gambling. These are distinctions without a
difference. It is time for state legislatures to step in and act to
protect their constituents from those members of the litigation
financing industry who prey on them.
225. See Ohio Legislation, AM. LEG. FIN. Ass'N (June 7, 2008),
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/PressReleases.asp.
226. See OASIS LEGAL FINANCE, http://www.oasislegal.com (last visited
Mar. 13, 2012). ("Not Available in Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Maryland or
North Carolina").
227. See Appelbaum, supra note 160.
228. See, e.g., CaseFunding Contingent Proceeds Purchase Agreement,
supra note 167.
229. See id.
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL REMEDIAL STATUTE
Because the litigation financing industry has proven itself
unwilling to meaningfully self-regulate, this article proposes a
model statute that can be incorporated as part of a state's existing
usury statute. Instead of designing, whole cloth, a licensing and
regulatory framework for the litigation financing industry, this
model remedial statute would simply bring LFCs within the
purview of each state's usury statute.
Often, the simplest solution is the best. Others have
suggested implementing a federal regulatory framework for
LFCs. 230  That approach is unwieldy, unlikely to survive the
lobbying efforts of the litigation financing industry, and ultimately
unnecessary. If LFCs operated within the boundaries of each
state's usury statutes, further regulation would not be needed.
Loans would be available to plaintiffs at fair prices, and despite
their cries to the contrary, LFCs would be able to make a decent
profit. It would be a simple, effective fix, which would require
only that each state's legislature amend its existing statute.
The proposed remedial statute is comprised of two parts: a
definition section clearly indicating what constitutes an LLA, and
a statute that requires any lending tied to litigation be construed
as a loan, whether contingent or not. The definition of an LLA
will resolve the uncertainty courts face when assessing whether or
not an LLA is a loan. It would also prevent LFCs' from using
obscure language in their LLAs. A litigation advance will be
considered a loan, pure and simple. The second part of the
proposed statute clearly brings these loans within the purview of
the usury statute.
Proposed Model Remedial Statute to Bring LFCs Within
the Purview of Usury Regulations:
WHEREAS, parties to civil litigation are, during the
pendency of such litigation, particularly vulnerable to
predatory lending practices, and
WHEREAS, lending by litigation financing companies
has, to date, gone largely unregulated,
the following statute is intended to bring litigation
230. See generally Shaltiel & Cofresi, supra note 22.
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financing agreements within the regulatory framework of
this state's usury statute(s).
Definitions: "Litigation Lending Agreement" (LLA): Any
agreement whereby monies are paid to parties to civil
litigation (litigants) in consideration for those litigants'
agreement to repay such monies (with or without
interest, one-time charges, use fees, or any other add-on
charges) from proceeds of the litigation. Not included in
the definition of an LLA are advancements of expenses of
litigation made by attorneys on behalf of their clients, as
permitted by Rule 1.8(e) of the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility.
Regardless of:
(a) whether an LLA characterizes itself as a "loan," an
"advance," an "investment," an "assignment of proceeds,"
or any other characterization,
(b) whether monies to be repaid under an LLA are called
"interest," "use fees," or any other term,
(c) whether the amount paid to the litigant under the
LLA otherwise exceeds any monetary threshold for the
amount of loans falling within this state's usury statute,
and
(d) whether the obligation on the part of the litigant to
repay monies is contingent upon the outcome of the
litigation or absolute,
all LLAs shall be considered loans within the purview of
this state's laws (reference specific statutes] intended to
protect individual borrowers from usurious loans.2 3 1
The proposed remedial statute has the beauty of simplicity.
231. This proposed remedial statute was incorporated into proposals
introduced in the Rhode Island General Assembly during the January 2011
session. See H. 5533, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2011); S. 0366,
2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2011).
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By utilizing a state's existing usury statute, the remedial statute
implicitly embodies the public policy of that state towards lending.
Usury statutes vary greatly from state to state. Most states set
interest rate ceilings, with the limit established by the legislature.
A handful of states, including Idaho, Oregon, Nevada, New
Hampshire, and Wyoming, have no laws at all against usury.232 it
is fair to view these differences as an expression of each state's
public policy intentions. By bringing litigation financing within
the existing framework of each state's usury statute, the remedial
statute merely extends the existing public policy. Because there is
no change to public policy, passage of the remedial statute should
be far easier than attempting to establish an entirely new
regulatory framework. Importantly, unlike a regulatory program,
this statute will rein in the excesses of litigation financing without
costing a dime to administer.
Unlike proposals to bring litigation financing under the
federal restrictions of TILA, this statute does not have a consumer
education aspect. That is because the concept of "consumer
education" is a red herring. All of the disclosures in the world will
not serve to protect a disadvantaged plaintiff who is in no position
to comparison shop. This Article's overview of LLAs should be
sufficient to suggest that plaintiffs will never have adequate
information to make a truly informed choice. Absent adequate
information, and lacking any real bargaining power, plaintiffs will
always be at the mercy of LFCs. Holding LFCs to the same
maximum rate as other types of lenders is the only real way to
protect plaintiffs.
Finally, in decision after decision, courts have called upon
legislatures to give them clearer guidance regarding litigation
financing. By bringing litigation financing within the purview of
the usury statutes, state legislatures can stop the semantic game
LFCs play in the wording of their LLAs. At the same time, courts
will be relieved of the obligation to play a parallel semantic game
in seeking to grant an equitable resolution to injured plaintiffs.
With clearer guidance from state law, courts can return to the
business of enforcing previously established public policy.
The litigation financing industry is sure to decry this proposal
as the end of litigation funding. Any prior attempt to construe
232. Barksdale, supra note 28, at 725.
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LLAs as usurious has been met with strong resistance and the
assertion that plaintiff-borrowers will be denied access to
financing. However, a look at the history of the industry belies
this argument. After Rancman, which cited interest rates of 180%
to 280%, it was claimed that efforts to regulate LFCs would result
in plaintiffs being denied access to financing.233 However, years
later, U.S. Claims is entering LLAs at an APR of 27%,234 and the
number of LFCs has increased substantially. Even absent the
sort of industry statistics that would be available if LFCs were
regulated, it stands to reason that litigation lending can still be
profitable if conducted in accordance with usury statutes.
It is true, though, that under this model remedial statute,
LFCs will not rake in the enormous gains they once saw. The
threat to those profits will motivate ALFA to lobby hard, with all
the financial capital it can muster, to prevent passage of this
statute. 235 Plaintiffs have no such lobbying group. Sadly, not
even the plaintiffs' bar can be counted on to lobby in favor of such
a proposal, as some of its members are the very people profiting by
their association with LFCs: many LFCs are owned and operated
by lawyers. 236 In fact, the court in Fausone noted the danger of
plaintiff attorneys using LFCs as means of funding each others'
clients in order to circumvent the ethical rule prohibiting such
funding:
[A] person who is the victim of an accident should not be
233. See Martin, Subprime, supra note 14, at 116.
234. See U.S. Claims Purchase Agreement, supra note 170.
235. During the 2011 session of the Rhode Island General Assembly,
ALFA paid former Senate Finance Chairman Stephen Alves over $29,000 to
lobby against S 0366. The bill was not voted out of committee. Peter Phipps,
Former Legislators Russo and Alves are Cashing in as Lobbyists, PROVIDENCE
J. (July 31, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://news.providencejournal.com/politics/
2011/07/former-legislat.html. Oasis Legal Funding paid a Rhode Island-
based lobbyist $30,000, presumably to oppose the same bill, while at the
same time paying its own in-house lobbyist. Lobby Tracker, OFF. SECRETARY
ST., http://sos.ri.gov//ltpublic/index.php?page=entity-detail&entityld=1518&
sessionId=8 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). It is worth noting that Rhode Island
is the smallest state in the union, there are no LFCs incorporated there and
the size of the market for litigation lending is tiny. The disproportionate
spending on lobbying efforts can only signal the importance of preventing the
precedent of any state construing LLAs as usurious.
236. George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Financing
Industry: How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 805, 823
(2001).
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further victimized by loan companies charging interest
rates that are higher than the risks associated with the
transaction.... Especially if lawyers establish litigation
loan companies to "service" one another's clients, these
high interest loans may actually be a method to increase
the lawyers' contingency fees. 237
With such deep-pocketed concerns opposed to any attempt to
limit the excesses of the litigation financing industry, it is
incumbent upon state legislatures to stand up for their
constituents. To muster the political will to take on this industry,
legislators should be reminded that, like sharks to shipwrecks,
LFCs often arrive in the wake of tragedy, drawn by the
unconscionably high rates of interest to be reaped from
disadvantaged plaintiffs who are in no position to bargain.
Legislators need only look to the recent history of tragic events,
from 9/11 to the Station Fire to Hurricane Katrina and act now to
protect the citizens of their own states against the predators who
are sure to arrive when future tragedy strikes.
V. CONCLUSION
It has become clear to even the litigation lenders that judges
view their practices with distaste. Dimitri Mishiev, of Alliance
Claim Funding, sums it up thusly: "[e]verything that might have
to go before a judge, you stay away because you don't want the
judge to be in the position of saying, 'I don't want that level of
payment. I think it's unreasonable.'. . . We don't want judges to
shine a light on us." 238  These same judges have called upon
legislators to take a closer look at litigation lending.
Given the growth of the litigation financing industry, and the
inadequate attempts to curb its excesses, the time has come to
bring litigation funding within the purview of state usury
statutes. Large-scale tragedies like the Station Nightclub fire can
help focus the attention of legislators on the plight of
disadvantaged plaintiffs. Sadly, mass tort plaintiffs are not the
only victims of the predatory lending practices of LFCs. Every
day, in every state, individual plaintiffs, injured by the negligence,
237. Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So.2d 626, 630 & n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).
238. Appelbaum, supra note 160.
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recklessness, and intentional acts of others, often unable to work
and in danger of losing their homes, turn to LFCs for desperately
needed funds. Is it too much to ask that such plaintiffs not be
further victimized in the form of usurious interest? Legislators
must act now to protect their constituents from predatory LFCs.
It is time to tame the "Wild West" of lending, and thereby protect
the most vulnerable of our citizens. 239
239. See Martin, Wild West, supra note 59.
